Extract from the SMALL VESSEL SECURITY STRATEGY document published by the Department of Homeland Security APRIL 2008

There are numerous examples overseas of  the use of small vessels as a waterborne improvised explosive device (WBIED) to attack maritime targets. These tactics could be applied against the United States and its interests to attack vessels, infrastructure, and industry (such as refineries and chemical plants) in the maritime domain. While not an exhaustive list, the following represents a range of high-profile tactics and targets that could be replicated in the United States.

• In August 2005, Turkish authorities arrested Louai Sakka, a senior al-Qaeda operative when a one-ton bomb he designed detonated prematurely. Sakka had intended to place the bomb on a yacht and ram a cruise ship carrying vacationing Israeli and S. soldiers on rest and recreation in Antalya, Turkey.

• In April 2004, terrorists using two fishing dhows packed with explosives attacked an Iraqi offshore oil terminal in the North Arabian Gulf, killing one U.S. Coast Guardsman and two U.S. Navy sailors protecting the terminal as they prepared to search one of the boats.

• In October 2002, Al-Qaeda directed an attack by an explosive-laden small boat against the French oil tanker M/V LIMBURG off the coast of Yemen. The attack resulted in fires on board the tanker, a large oil spill, and killed one and injured four crew members.

• In October 2000, Al-Qaeda attacked the USS COLE and killed 17 S. Navy sailors by navigating an explosive-laden small boat alongside the destroyer as it was refueling pier side in Aden, Yemen.

• The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have conducted numerous successful suicide attacks using small boats against the Sri Lankan Government and its Their attacks have destroyed or damaged several civilian and military vessels.

Significant naval assets, CI, and KR such as offshore oil platforms, merchant vessels (including oil and chemical tankers), and passenger vessels (such as ferries and cruise ships) operate in areas that are frequented by small vessels. Small vessels may easily blend or disappear into other vessel traffic in ports and the coastal maritime environment, and are usually subject to less scrutiny than larger vessels in these areas. They are often inconspicuous, fast, highly maneuverable, and able to quickly relocate via roads and surface transportation, making them particularly dangerous and lethal if used as WBIEDs. Additionally, operators do not require extensive training or large crews, and these vessels can be acquired relatively  easily and inexpensively, thereby making them a very attractive and available mode of attack.

The use of a small vessel as a WBIED also has potential consequences that would exceed the immediate casualties or damage caused by the attack. For instance, the U.S. military relies heavily on the maritime transportation system (MTS) to deliver equipment and supplies to forces abroad, as most of American military power is transported by sea through Department of Defense (DOD) facilities at 15 key seaports. A successful WBIED attack, particularly at one of these military ports, has the potential to seriously disrupt movement of arms, ammunition, military supplies, and military units, depending on the intensity of the strike. As shut downs of certain West Coast ports during a labor dispute demonstrated, the impacts of even a temporary disruption of the maritime transportation system can be substantial.